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Moresi: Protecting Individual Rights Through the
Louisiana Constitution
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a growing number of individual rights advocates
have turned their hopes of securing substantial protection of fundamental
rights from the U.S. Constitution to the constitutions of the fifty states.,
This renewed emphasis on state constitutional interpretation is born
primarily out of the U.S. Supreme Court's conservative interpretation
of the Bill of Rights. 2 The current majority, as was the case with the
Burger Court before it, has limited the avenues of redress for an in-
dividual whose rights have been infringed. They have done so by nar-
rowly defining the scope of the protections offered by the U.S.
Constitution3 and by limiting, an individual's constitutional private right
Copyright 1993, by LoUIsLAN LAw REvIEw.
1. See generally Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bill of Rights Claims,
63 Tex. L. Rev. 1269 (1985).
2. The Burger Court, led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, was the first court in
recent history to appear truly "hostile" to any expansion in the protections provided by
the U.S. Constitution. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 503, 505 (1985). When the Burger Court first began limiting the Constitution,
previously persuasive commentators of the 1950s and 1960s who had argued for expansion
of the "state action" limit on the constitution seemed to give up the idea of securing
real protection from the document. Now, with a similar conservative approach by the
present majority, commentators advocating expanded constitutional protections have reap-
peared. See Friesen, supra note 1, at 1271.
3. The scope is being narrowed in (1) who has the rights, (2) how claims for
Violations of those rights may be brought and against whom, and (3) the substance of
the protections.
"[Tihe source of all constitutional rights is the written Constitution, and ... the
language of the document protects rights only from interference by the state." See
Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 520, defining the positivist approach to constitutional
protections. Also, see, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.10, 98 S.
Ct. 1729, 1735 n. 10 (1978), where Justice Rehnquist clearly relies on this positivist approach.
Also, Justice O'Connor considered in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 108 S. Ct.
2460 (1988), that the presence of a government program suggests that Congress believes
it has provided adequate remedies and therefore no private cause of action for damages
under the Constitution exists. In so holding, the Court never actually discussed what
remedies were available. See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages
Claims, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1117, 1124 (1989), discussing judicial willingness to defer to
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of action by holding that the power to grant such an action lies solely
within the legislative domain.4 As a result, law professors, judges, and
practitioners have begun to urge state courts to do what the federal
judiciary has declined to do-"put teeth" 5 in their own constitutions
by ensuring that the rights granted therein will be meaningfully upheld.
In Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries,6 the Louisiana
Supreme Court was faced with a claim for individual protection based
on the state constitution. In that case, which involved alleged unrea-
sonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy by agents of the
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, the court indicated its support
for this emerging emphasis on state constitutional protection of individual
rights by holding for the first time that a violation of article I, section
5 of the Louisiana State Constitution 7 gives rise to a private cause of
action. The court also indicated for the first time that those protections
go beyond limiting "state action" and apply directly to prohibit such
invasions of privacy by private, non-government parties. While the plain-
tiff's claim in Moresi was ultimately denied on the merits, the significance
of that decision is that its language indicates the willingness of the
Congress.
Another method of narrowing the scope offered by constitutional protections is the
doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is an attempt to reconcile two com-
peting interests. It is designed to permit aggrieved individuals to seek redress for violations
of their constitutional rights while at the same time protecting federal officials from the
inhibiting effect such suits can bring. The injured party's right to redress disappears if
the official violating his rights was acting in "good faith." See Perry M. Rosen, The
Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 337, 349 (1989).
4. Justice Rehnquist wrote in his dissent in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 31-54,
100 S. Ct. 1468, 1478-90 (1980), that "absent a clear indication from Congress, federal
courts lack the authority to grant damages relief for constitutional violations" and that
these causes of action lie within the legislative domain. Id. at 41, 100 S. Ct. at 1483.
That reasoning appeared somewhat in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S. Ct. 2404
(1983), where the Court denied a Bivens remedy to a federal employee who filed suit
under the First Amendment, because Congress occupied the area by a comprehensive
procedural and substantive program.
5. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 338 (discussing Bivens); John M. Harlow, Comment,
California v. Acevedo: The Ominous March of a Loyal Foot Soldier, 52 La. L. Rev.
1205 (1992).
6. 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990).
7. Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions of pri-
vacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by a'search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
La. Const. art. I, §5.
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Louisiana Supreme Court to grant recovery for such claims. The pos-
sibility of a Louisiana "constitutional tort" 8 through article I, section
5, as well as such actions being available against private conduct, holds
great promise for advocates of the protection of individual rights through
state constitutions.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's showing of support for the "con-
stitutional tort" and the elimination of the "state actor" requirement
with regard to certain provisions of the state's constitution is by far
not a first on the state court level. Several other states have adopted
these approaches to their own constitutions. 9 But despite the enthusiasm
of advocates and the apparently broad acceptance in state courts, many
criticize the ideas themselves, 0 and some question the courts' ability to
effectively implement them."
This casenote will argue that despite those uncertainties, the Louis-
iana courts can and should continue down the path indicated in Moresi.
Specifically, in Part I this casenote will discuss the facts and holding
of the Louisiana case along with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal
Narcotics Agents,'2 which marked the U.S. Supreme Court's first rec-
ognition of the "constitutional tort." Part II will discuss the development
of the constitutional tort in both the federal and state legal systems and
will further examine the authority of the Louisiana Supreme Court to
grant such an action. This section also will discuss several problems
facing the implementation of the "Bivens" doctrine such as the use of
the "special factors" exception 3 discussed by Justice Brennan in the
8. This principle was first seen in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
9. Some of the states adopting all or part of these doctrines include California,
New Jersey, Mississippi, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York. Also, refer infra to notes
58-67 and 103-112 and accompanying text for more discussion of these states.
10. In Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 840 (Wis. 1987), Wisconsin's supreme court
reasoned that "[tlo turn what was a prohibition of governmental acts into positive rights
against other private persons is not logical nor historically established." See also SHAD
Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985), Jennifer Friesen, Should
California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Actors?,
17 Hastings L.Q. 111, 116 (1989), and John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to "State
Action" as a Limit on State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and
Proposal, 21 Rutgers L.J. 820 (1990), for discussions of the elimination of the "state
action" limit.
11. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 825 ("The underlying concern appears to be that
if courts abandon threshold requirements of state action there will be no principled means
to prevent 'constitutionalization' of an unacceptably broad range of private law and private
relationships"). See also Rosen, supra note 3, for a discussion of the obstacles facing
the fulfillment of the Bivens doctrine.
12. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
13. Id. at 396, 91 S. Ct. at 2005. Brennan wrote, "The present case involves no
special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."
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case. Part III of this casenote will follow the development of the "state
action" limitation in constitutional interpretation and will discuss how
many state courts have begun to read sections of their own constitutions
as providing broader protections to the individual. The section also will
discuss the basis of such an expansion of the Louisiana Constitution
and will examine the arguments made against such expansion. In Part
IV, the casenote will recommend how the state legislature can ensure
the stability of the constitutional tort while also satisfying the critics by
enacting a statute which creates and defines a cause of action for
violations by both private and state actors of specific provisions of the
Louisiana Constitution. Although legislation would be the best and most
effective approach to guaranteeing greater individual rights, this casenote
concludes that until the legislature speaks on the issue, the courts of
Louisiana must embrace Moresi and the promises it holds for individual
rights in this state.
II. BivENs AND MORESI
Part of the action brought in Moresi was based on the Louisiana
Constitution. This allowed the Louisiana Supreme Court to address the
possibility of a private right of action based on provisions of the
constitution. In so doing, the court focused on the Bivens case of 1971
in which the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a private right of
action in the U.S. Constitution. Before discussing the Moresi decision,
it is essential to discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens to grant
recovery under the Fourth Amendment.
A. Supreme Court Recognition
In Bivens, ,the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether the Fourth Amendment provided an individual the right to
recover money damages for violations of its protections. On November
26, 1965, Webster Bivens was sitting at home with his wife and children
when six federal agents allegedly entered his apartment without a warrant
and conducted a search. When the search ended, the agents arrested
Bivens and placed him in manacles. Both the search and the arrest
allegedly were conducted with excessive force., 4 After being placed under
arrest, Bivens was booked, interrogated, and subjected to a visual strip
search at the federal courthouse in Brooklyn. As a result of these events,
Bivens brought a civil action in federal court claiming he suffered great
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering. He sought $15,000
in damages from each of the agents and based his civil claim upon the
Fourth Amendment.'5
14. Id. at 389, 91 S. Ct. at 2001.
15. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
1644 [Vol. 53
NO TES
The district court in New York dismissed the action based on a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for want of a claim upon which
relief could be granted.' 6 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, but
affirmed that court's decision in that the plaintiff needed a federal
statutory right in order to recover money damages for the agents'
conduct. 7 In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit said, "The view
that statutory authority is a prerequisite for a federal cause of action
for damages, even though the wrong complained of is the violation of
a constitutional right, has been adopted by all of the courts which have
examined this question recently."' 8 The court continued, saying that the
"medium contemplated [for the violations Bivens complained of] was
... the common law action of trespass, administered in our judicial
system by the state courts."' 9 The Fourth Amendment's place in the
scheme, according to the Second Circuit, was simply a limit on the
agents' defense that their actions were authorized by the national gov-
ernment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the case in order to
address the Fourth Amendment issue. 20
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan rejected the Second Cir-
cuit's characterization of the Fourth Amendment as merely a limit on
the agents' defense in a state tort action. In finding a right of action
in the Fourth Amendment, Justice Brennan placed substantial importance
on the disparity of power that existed between the government agents
involved and private citizens. He wrote, "An agent acting-albeit un-
constitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater
capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority
other than his own.' '21 That disparity of power, Brennan reasoned,
justifies the right of a private citizen to bring a cause of action against
federal officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment. These "con-
stitutional torts" recognized by the Court have since been called Bivens
actions.
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
16. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F.
Supp. 12 (N.Y. D.C. 1967), affirmed, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded,
403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
17. Bivens, 409 F.2d at 718.
18. Id. at 720.
19. Id. at 721.
20. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, cert.
granted, 399 U.S. 905, 90 S. Ct. 2203 (1970), rev'd and remanded, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.
Ct. 1999 (1971).
21. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392, 91 S. Ct. at 2002.
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Brennan found the Court's authority to grant such a right of action
by establishing jurisdiction based on the Court's decision in Bell v.
Hood.22 In Bell, the plaintiff sought damages against the Federal Bureau
of Investigation for an illegal arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful
searches and seizures. The Court found the claim was a controversy
arising under the Constitution of the United States within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1331,23 thus the lower court had subject matter juris-
diction. According to the Court, the power to hear Bell, as well as
Bivens, was founded upon the existence of federal question jurisdiction
to the extent that the Constitution provides a substantive right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures at the hands of federal
authority.24
Once Justice Brennan found federal question jurisdiction, he took
the next step and said it was the Court's duty to provide enforcement
of the protections found in the Constitution and that the Court had
the inherent power to fashion appropriate remedies for such enforcement.
The Fourth Amendment, Brennan wrote, is a right that, absent factors
"counselling hesitation," deserves protection by the Supreme Court.2
After concluding that Bivens deserved the protection of the federal
court and that the federal courts have the authority to grant such
protection, Justice Brennan discussed the validity of enabling Bivens to
be compensated for his injuries through damages in a civil action. The
Court conceded that the language of the Fourth Amendment did not
expressly provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages;
however, Justice Brennan concluded that when a "federal statute pro-
vides for a general right to sue ... federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done." '26
B. Louisiana's Recognition
While the facts of Moresi are not as dramatic as those in Bivens,
they did provide the Louisiana Supreme Court an opportunity to discuss
the Bivens doctrine and its application to our state constitution. On
January 11, 1986, four agents from the Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries were stationed at Stelly's Landing in Vermillion Parish to watch
for game violators. It was the final day of the duckhunting season, and
the agents had received a tip that a hunter would be transporting illegally
22. 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 773 (1946).
23. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
24. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392, 91 S. Ct. at 2002 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
66 S. Ct. 773 (1946)).
25. Id. at 396, 91 S. Ct. at 2005.
26. Id., 91 S. Ct. at 2005 (citing Bell, 327 U.S. at 684, 66 S. Ct. at 777.
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taken ducks via the landing. As part of the investigation, the agents
decided to check all boats coming into the landing. 2'
After a full day of duckhunting, eighteen-year-old Patrick Damas
Moresi and twenty-one-year-old Kern Alleman approached Stelly's Land-
ing carrying equipment and supplies, as well as a large number of slain
ducks and a large ice chest (all fully visible on their mudboat). When
the hunters reached the landing, one of the agents boarded -the vessel,
inspected the slain ducks and, after asking the hunters what the ice
chest contained, opened the chest. The agent also searched the life
preserver compartment of the boat. In the course of these inspections,
the agents found several untagged ducks (a violation of federal law). 2
After searching the boat, the agents took the hunters back to the
Moresi and Alleman Camp two miles away to ensure that the hunters
were not using the tags as a ruse to smuggle out a stockpile of ducks.
While at the camp, an agent lifted the lid of an empty ice chest sitting
in front of the camp and glanced inside. After discussing the tagging
violations with the fathers of the two hunters, the agents returned the
hunters to Stelly's Landing and issued citations for violating the federal
game laws and regulations. 29
As a result of the searches, two young duck hunters and their fathers
filed suit against the four game agents for violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983,30 article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution,3 and Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315.32 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and awarded actual damages of $43,000, 33 punitive damages
of $4,000, and attorneys' fees of $32,939.10. The court concluded that
27. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (La. 1990).
28. Id. at 1083, 1089 (regarding the tagging requirements).
29. The final incident involved in the case occurred more than a month later. Moresi
and Alleman returned to the camp to find a business card of a wildlife enforcement
officer with an inscription on its back: "We missed you this time but look out next
time." Through discussions and correspondence between the department and the fathers,
it was discovered that the business card was intended for another camp and was left at
the Moresi-Alleman camp by mistake. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1084.
30. Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1965).
31. See supra note 7.
32. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose
fault it happened to repair it." La. Civ. Code art. 2315. This claim was rejected by the
court because the plaintiffs failed to show physical injury, illness, or other physical
consequences resulting from the mistake of the agents. The court held that the agents'
acts were not intentional, outrageous, or related to another tort and that the injuries were
not sufficiently severe to allow recovery. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1095-96.
33. Patrick Damas Moresi and his father were given $10,000 each in actual damages
1993] 1647
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the agents did not have reasonable cause to detain the hunters or to
conduct any of the searches or seizures. On appeal, the third circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment.3 4 The case was then appealed to
the Louisiana Supreme Court, which reversed and dismissed the plain-
tiffs' suit based on its finding of qualified immunity. The supreme court
discussed the plaintiffs' three claims individually; however, this casenote
will focus on the court's analysis of the two claims based on § 1983
and article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution.
1. The § 1983 Claim
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and prove
that conduct occurred under color of state law and that this conduct
deprived him or her of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or a law of the United States. The cause of action is
directed at actions by state officials only.3 5 Therefore, a plaintiff's tough-
est obstacle in a 1983 action often is overcoming the qualified immunity
of the state official.36 The Supreme Court has ruled that government
officials "performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights . . .- 7
Writing for the majority in Moresi, Justice Dennis found that the
wildlife agents' conduct clearly occurred under the color of state law
but was within the performance of their discretionary functions. Re-
garding the stop and the "brief" detention of Moresi and Alleman, the
court reasoned that the agents did not deprive the hunters of any right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the U.S. Constitution: "[Iln some
circumstances an officer may detain a suspect briefly for questioning
although he does not have 'probable cause' to believe that the suspect
is involved in criminal activity .... "-3 The brief stop may be justified
by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about
to be, engaged in criminal activity or is wanted for past criminal conduct.3 9
and $1,000 each in punitive damages. Howard Alleman was given $13,000 in actual
damages and $1,000 punitive damages, while his parents received $10,000 in actual damages.
Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 552 So. 2d 1259 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 567 So. 2d 1081 (1990).
34. Id.
35. This limitation to § 1983 is one of the primary reasons courts felt compelled to
intervene in a Bivens-type situation involving federal actors violating the Constitution.
Congress had provided a cause of action for violations of the Constitution by state
authorities but left the injured party with no action against a federal actor who violated
the Constitution.
36. See supra note 3.
37. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).
38. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (La. 1990).
39. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
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The court found that the agents had been informed that a suspected
game violator would be exiting the marsh at Stelly's Landing with a
large quantity of illegal game. It was clear that the two young hunters
in this case were transporting large quantities of ducks. Consequently,
the court held: "Under the circumstances, the agents had a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting that the hunters were engaged or had
engaged in game violations. The limited purpose of the stop ... was
to question the occupants of the boat about the ducks in their pos-
session."40
With regard to the agents' inspection of the ice chest and life
preserver compartments, the court applied the doctrine of qualified
immunity and found that a "reasonable officer could have believed these
inspections to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the
information the searching officers possessed." '4' The court reasoned that
because at the time of the searches the law regarding checkpoint or
random stops and inspections was unclear, the officers could have be-
lieved that their actions did not violate an established right. 42 Therefore,
the officers were immune from suit under § 1983.
2. The State Constitutional Claim
The plaintiffs in Moresi sought in the alternative to recover damages
for violations of their right under article I, section 5 of the state
constitution to be secure in their persons and property from unreasonable
searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy. Such rights cantiot be vin-
dicated through a 1983 action, which merely creates a cause of action
against officials of a state who have allegedly violated a right protected
by the federal constitution or laws. Section 1983 does not enforce the
protections of a state constitution. At the time of Moresi, as well as
today, Louisiana had no statutory equivalent to § 1983 legislatively
creating a cause of action for violation of the state constitution; there-
fore, the court's first step was to discuss whether such a cause of action
could be inferred directly under the Louisiana Constitution. Typically,
state courts address two subjects when determining whether or not their
state constitution provides a cause of action for this type of violation:
(1) whether a Bivens-type claim exists in any of the state constitutional
provisions, and (2) whether there is a requirement for state action before
private actions can be commenced to enforce such provisions .
40. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1087.
41. Id.
42. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979). In that case, the officer
stopped Prouse for a license check and saw marijuana in the interior of the automobile.
Delaware defended the action based on the need for preserving public safety through
license and registration checks. The Court held the stop was invalid given the alternative
mechanisms available and the incremental contribution such stops have in promoting
highway safety. See also Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1087-88.
43. See Friesen, supra note 1.
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To the first question, whether the state constitution implies any
Bivens type of actions, the Louisiana Supreme Court answered "yes."
The court referred to the clear terms of the provision at issue. Justice
Dennis cited Professor Hargrave's well-read Declaration of Rights44 ar-
ticle, which first asserted the affirmative nature of article I, section 5.
Hargrave wrote that the article's deliberate placement apart from other
criminal procedural provisions was an indication that its intended effect
was on non-criminal cases. 45 Also, Hargrave noted that the addition of
property and communications to those rights being protected against
unreasonable invasions of privacy created a "fertile ground" for de-
velopment of tort law.46
The court listed several sources of its authority for granting a private
right of action under article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution:
(1) the textual formula of the provision, (2) its history as recorded at
the convention, and (3) the similarity of the provision to the Fourth
Amendment in the federal Constitution. 47 Article I, section 5, which
states in part that "[e]very person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches,
seizures or invasions of privacy," is worded such that it is an affirmative
grant of a right to an individual rather than a limit on state authority.
It can be argued that the language "no law shall" indicates restrictions
on the state. If such language is violated, the state is the focus of
corrective measures, i.e., exclusion of evidence or injunction. On the
other hahd, "every person shall," which is used in article I, section 5,
indicates a mandatory, affirmative right for the individual to be secure
in his "person, property, communications, houses, papers and effects." '4
Rather than stating the right as a promise to limit what the state "shall"
have the power to do, the wording of article I, section 5 implies that
the rights are promises to the individual. If that provision is violated,
the person whose right was abridged is the focus of the remedy.
44. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1091 (citing Lee Hargrave, Declaration of Rights, 35 La.
L. Rev. 1 (1974)).
45. See Hargrave, supra note 44, at 20-21.
46. Id. at 21. Prior to Moresi, the Louisiana court made similar assertions regarding
article 1, section 5. In Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1092, Justice Dennis cited Jaubert v. Crowley
Post-Signal, 375 So. 2d 1386, 1387 n.2 (La. 1983), in which Justice Dixon outlined the
federal and state approaches to privacy rights based both on tort and constitutional
grounds. In that case, Justice Dixon indicated there was a cause of action under article
I, section 5, but directed most of his discussion of the provision toward its application
to private conduct. Justice Dixon had cited Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1978), writ denied, 366 So. 2d 564 (1979), which denied a radio station's request
for disclosure of various officials' job evaluations because it would be an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy. This, along with Justice Dixon's approval in Jaubert, indicates that
article 1, section 5 provides an affirmative right against private conduct.
47. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1092-93.
48. Id. See also La. Const. art. I, § 5.
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Justice Dennis cited the history of the provision as a source of the
court's authority in finding a private cause of action, yet that history
is far from express in its support for such an application of article I,
section 5. The idea of finding protection for individuals in article I,
section 5 was mentioned during the debates, but it was not resolved.4 9
It seems that the resolution of that debate was left for another day or
perhaps for the judiciary.
A large part of Justice Dennis' discussion of the court's power to
grant a right of action under the state constitution parallelled Justice
Brennan's discussion in Bivens. Both Brennan and Dennis gave special
consideration to the allocation of power among individuals and those
acting pursuant to government authority. In both cases, the courts
reasoned that in cases involving a disparity of power, the citizen has
no method of protection other than that provided by the courts.5 0 Also,
Justice Dennis compared the protections in the Louisiana Constitution
with those of the Magna Carta, just as Justice Brennan compared Fourth
Amendment protections with those of the Common Law in the Bivens
opinion. An individual could be granted an action for damages for a
violation of the Magna Carta under the Common Law of England.
Such a violation was viewed as a trespass. 1 This reasoning was also
cited in Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Center,5 2 where the Maryland
Supreme Court found a right of action under Articles 24 and 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
As for the second question addressed in Moresi, whether there is
a state action requirement in order to have a claim for relief under
article I, section 5, the court stated in dicta that there is no such
requirement.53 This part of the analysis was not discussed at length
because the actors involved in Moresi were state agents for the De-
partment of Wildlife and Fisheries. However, Justice Dennis opened the
door to tremendous possibilities for individual rights advocates when he
wrote in Moresi that the absence of "no law shall" in the language of
article I, section 5 indicated that its protections reach far beyond limiting
only state action.5 4
Although the court did find the plaintiffs could state a claim for
damages under the state constitution, the court denied recovery largely
for the same reason it denied the plaintiffs' § 1983 damages claim. The
49. See infra notes 135-136.
50. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 391-92, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2001-02 (1971); Moresi v. Department of Wildlife &
Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1092-93 (La. 1990).
51. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1092.
52. 479 A.2d 921, 924 (Md. 1984).
53. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1092.
54. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 133-142.
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defendants, Dennis wrote, were entitled to qualified immunity because
they did not violate any clearly established state constitutional right as
of January 11, 1986. The plaintiffs contended that State v. Parms" had
established a right against invasions of privacy through motor vehicle
checkpoints and that the conduct of the agents at Stelly's Landing was
sufficiently similar to such checkpoints as to be in violation of a clearly
established right. The court rejected this argument because Parms was
decided after the incident involving the game agents and because rea-
sonable jurists could disagree as to whether the case is "directly and
fully controlling with respect to game agents' stops of sportsmen in the
marsh for questioning with respect to possible game or boating viola-
tions. ''36
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
A. Acceptance of the Bivens Doctrine
When the Supreme Court in Bivens decided to grant a private cause
of action under the Fourth Amendment, the idea was not a revolutionary
one. Well before 1971, legal scholars had argued that providing a remedy
for the violation of a constitutional right is a necessary part of actually
providing the protections. Chief Justice Marshall in 1803 believed that
it was essential for the proper functioning of government for the courts
to provide a remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. Marshall
wrote: "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is
that limitation committed to writing, if these limits, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained?" 5 7 With Bivens, the Supreme
Court advanced the writings of Marshall by establishing that the Fourth
Amendment was a right that deserved protection by the courts.
When recognizing the right of action, Justice Brennan qualified the
right to be protected by stating, "The present case involves no special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress." 58 The Court did not indicate what factors might counsel a
court to hesitate in granting a remedy for violations of the Fourth
Amendment, but the phrase clearly indicates that the Court believed
there would be some instances in which such a private action would
not be appropriate. It also indicates the Court saw its role as a secondary
one whenever Congress had legislated on the particular matter at issue.
55. 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988).
56. Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1094.
57. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
58. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2005 (1971).
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Accordingly, resolving this uncertainty has occupied much of the time
of both federal and state courts when determining whether there is a
right of action in the provision at issue and also whether a private cause
of action is appropriate based on the particular violation involved in
the case.
1. Federal Courts
Following Bivens, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed willing to grant
similar causes of action for violation of other federal constitutional
guarantees.5 9 In a separate but somewhat similar line of cases, the Court
was also inclined to grant an implied cause of action from federal
statutes. For example, even before Bivens, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,60
the Court granted a private cause of action for deceptive proxy solic-
itation in obtaining authorization for corporate action under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934. Although the Exchange Act did not
expressly provide for such a claim, the Court found that it was necessary
to make the statute's protection of investors effective. The Exchange
Act granted the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce
any liability or duty created by its provisions. From this grant of
jurisdiction, the Court inferred an obligation to provide a private right
to recovery. 6'
Today, the Supreme Court's treatment of implied causes of action
from both constitutional and statutory provisions is more deferential to
Congress. 62 In Schweiker v. Chilicky,63 the Court discussed whether the
59. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979) (Davis alleged her
Fifth Amendment rights were violated when she lost her job with a Congressman merely
because she was a woman; the Court granted recovery); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,
100 S. Ct. 1468 (1988) (mother recovered under the Eighth Amendment for the death of
her son in prison).
60. 377 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct. 1555 (1964).
61. Id. at 432-33, 84 S. Ct. at 1559-60.
62. After expressing an apparent willingness to grant a cause of action despite the
existence of other applicable federal statutes in Davis and Carlson, the Court became
more reluctant to do so beginning in 1983. Decisions by the Court focused more on the
"special factors counselling hesitation," and the Court usually found those factors sufficient
to deny a cause of action. In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302, 103 S. Ct. 2362,
2366 (1983), the Court held a constitutional claim could not be maintained because of
the unique disciplinary structure of the military and the legislature's activity in the field.
The existence of a "comprehensive internal system of justice" made a Bivens-type of
remedy inappropriate. Also, in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983), the
elaborate remedial scheme developed by Congress for civil servants was held to prevent
a Bivens action, despite the absence of attorneys' fees or compensation for alleged
emotional and dignitary harms. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S. Ct. 3054
(1987), extended the Chappell holding to include activity incident to military service. In
that case, a former serviceman brought suit for injuries resulting from the administration
19931 1653
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
improper denial of Social Security disability benefits gave rise to a cause
of action for money damages. In holding that it did not, the Court
said it would be cautious before expanding Bivens to different contexts.
The "special factors" discussed by Justice Brennan in the Bivens decision
were held to include appropriate judicial deference to indications that
"congressional inaction has not been inadvertent." While the Court
will still hear some Bivens claims, this new deference to Congress tends
to increase the reliance by individual rights advocates on state courts
to recognize such claims based upon state constitutions and statutes.
2. State Courts
After the Bivens decision, several states began to find implied causes
of action under their own constitutions. Many courts and commentators
reason that a constitutional provision that does not by its terms require
legislative action to become effective or enforceable is "self-executing.' '65
In other words, the rights conferred by or the purpose of the provision
and its enforcement are intended to be carried out without such legislative
enactment. For example, a Florida court in Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank
Lines and Risk Management Services, Inc."6 held that article 1, section
2 of the Florida Constitution, which says that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap,"
was self-executing because it "sufficiently delineated 'a rule by means
of which the right or purpose which it gives or is intended to accomplish
may be determined, enjoyed or protected without legislative enact-
ment.' 67 The finding that the clause was self-executing enabled the
court to provide relief without legislative action. To deny a cause of
action under such a provision, according to the court, would be to
"negate the will of the people. '6
In 1979, California clearly accepted Bivens in Gay Law Students
Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.69 by stating, "The absence
of the drug LSD to him, without his consent, as part of an army experiment. Justice
O'Connor dissented in part in that the conduct alleged was "so far beyond the bounds
of human decency" that it could not be considered part of the military mission. Stanley,
483 U.S. at 709, 107 S. Ct. at 3065.
63. 487 U.S. 412, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988).
64. Id. at 423, 108 S. Ct. at 2468.
65. See Nichol, supra note 3, at 1121. See also Friesen, supra note 1 and W. Lee
Hargrave, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 38 La. L. Rev. 438 (1988).
66. 408 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), approved by Schreiner v. McKenzie
Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983).
67. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 714 (citing Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla.
1960)).
68. Id.
69. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
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of . . . an administrative remedy, however, provides no justification for
the judiciary to fail to enforce individual rights under the state Con-
stitution. ' 70 In King v. Alaska State Housing Authority,71 the Alaska
Supreme Court accepted a Bivens action through its constitutional pro-
vision article I, section 7,72 but denied recovery based on the existence
of special policy considerations and the inappropriateness of money
damages. An Illinois appellate court in Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison 
3
found a private cause of action under Illinois' Constitution article I,
section 17 by examining the text and the legislative history. The provision
expressly allows enforcement "without action by the General Assembly
' 74
to provide "recourse to existing judicial or legislative remedies." ' 75
As mentioned earlier, historical reasoning was used in Widgeon v.
Eastern Shore Hospital Center 76 to grant authority to the court. The
70. Id. at 602 n.10. For other state decisions granting a cause of action in their state
constitutions, see also Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984)
(court assumed the existence of a Bivens action, but dismissed the claim because defendant
was a private party); King v. Alaska St. Hous. Auth., 633 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1981);
Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 377 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (court examined
the text and history of the state constitution); Newell v. City of Elgin, 340 N.E.2d 344
(Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984)
(court's reasoning was similar to Moresi in that it noted the similarities in the state
provision to the amendments used by the U.S. Supreme Court to grant a cause of action);
Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1983); Smith v. Department
of Public Health, 410 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) (text, history, previous interpretations,
and the degree of specificity were among the considerations of the court in granting a
cause of action under the state constitution); 77th Dist. Judge v. State, 438 N.W.2d 333
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of
Conway, 503 A.2d 1385 (N.H. 1986) (recognized Bivens, but said remedy was inappropriate
for equal protection claim); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465 (N.J.
1978) (court stated that the legislature could not curtail constitutional rights through its
silence and that it was the judiciary's obligation to protect the fundamental rights of
individuals); Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 175 A.2d 639 (N.J. 1961); Lloyd v.
Borough of Stone Harbor, 432 A.2d 572 (Ch. Div. 1981); Hunter v. Port Auth., 419
A.2d 631 (Pa. 1980); Nelson v. Lane County, 720 P.2d 1291 (Or. App. 1986), aff'd, 743
P.2d 692 (Or. 1987).
71. 633 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1981).
72. Id. Alaska Const. art. I, § 7 states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and just treatment
in the court of legislative and executive investigations shall not be infringed."
73. 377 N.E.2d 242 (IIl. App. Ct. 1978).
74. Id. at 243. III. Const. art. I, § 17 (1978) states: "All persons shall have the right
to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry and
sex in the hiring and promotion practices of an employer or in the sale or rental of
property. These rights are enforceable without action by the General Assembly .... "
75. Walinski, 377 N.E.2d at 244 (citing VI Committee Proposals-Record of Pro-
ceedings of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 69 (May 22, 1970)).
76. 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984); see supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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Maryland court of appeal compared its articles to certain provisions of
the Magna Carta, a violation of which would generally give rise to an
action in damages. The court also reasoned that its state provisions were
analogous to the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth amendments of the federal
Constitution, under which individuals had been granted a private cause
of action. 7
7
B. Implying the Action in Louisiana
In Moresi, Justice Dennis cited the textual formula of article I,
section 5, the history of the provision, and its similarity to the Fourth
Amendment as authority for granting a private cause of action under
the Louisiana Constitution. The Louisiana court also drew support from
the several states already recognizing an individual's right to seek dam-
ages for a violation of his rights guaranteed in the respective state
constitutions. 7s Aside from this reasoning, there are other arguments
favoring such actions.
First, the premise asserted in Bivens and Bell-that a constitution
creates substantive rights, that such rights imply a remedy, and that the
court must enforce those rights-is equally true with regard to a state
constitution. This is particularly true when the self-executing nature of
a provision, such as article I, section 5, is taken into account. 79 Also,
the argument asserted in Borak that the provision or statute must be
given effect through enforcement by the court in private causes of action
can apply to provisions such as those in article I, section 5, where the
individual rights granted therein would be largely ineffective without
some form of private remedy.
In Eiche v. Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education
(BESE), s0 the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished self-executing pro-
visions from those that require legislative action by finding that article
VIII, section 3(a) was not self-executing. The provision creates BESE
and states that BESE "shall supervise and control the public elementary
and secondary schools, vocational-technical training and special schools
under its jurisdiction and shall have budgetary responsibility for all
funds appropriated or allocated by the state for those schools, as pro-
vided by law." 8 According to the court, the phrase "as provided by
law" indicated that BESE's powers were dependent on laws passed by
the legislature . 2 Constitutional provisions commonly contain phrases
77. Id. at 927 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979)). See
also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1988).
78. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1092 (La. 1990).
79. See supra note 65.
80. 582 So. 2d 186 (La. 1991).
81. La. Const. art. VIII, § 3(a). See also Eiche, 582 So. 2d at 189.
82. Eiche, 582 So. 2d at 189.
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such as "as provided by law" and "the legislature shall enact laws to
implement." Such provisions would seem to be ineffective without action
by the legislature. For example, Article IX, section 1 of the Louisiana
Constitution expressly mandates action by the legislature in order to
implement environmental provisions3
On the other hand, a provision lacking such an explicit need for
legislation is effective on its own. This is the self-executing provision
discussed earlier with respect to other state decisions. "[The ideal] con-
stitution would contain only self-executing provisions that are judicially
enforceable and have a clear effect without the necessity for legislation
to implement them."14 Article I, section 5 provides guarantees to the
individual and contains no requirement for legislative action before it
can be enforced. This indicates that its protections are self-executing
and can be enforced by the judiciary despite the silence of the legislature.
Other such provisions in article I of the Louisiana Constitution include
section 4, which is the right to acquire, own, control, and enjoy private
property; section 10, which grants the right to vote; and section 12,
which ensures access to public areas free from discrimination. Each of
these provisions seems to provide, logically, an affirmative right to
individuals through the constitution, just as article I, section 5 does.
C. Criticisms of the Doctrine
Despite the apparent exuberance on the part of a growing number
of states, Bivens actions have not been adopted without criticism. Justices
Blackmun and Black addressed some of the biggest criticisms of the
constitutional tort in their dissents in Bivens. In practical terms, both
Blackmun and Black feared an onslaught of frivolous lawsuits against
federal officials as a result of the majority's opinion. 5 Justice Black
asserted that the "task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating
judicial remedies . . . [was] a matter for Congress and the legislatures
of the states. '8 6 As discussed above, the current majority has begun to
follow that argument more frequently when addressing implied causes
83. See Hargrave, supra note 65, at 441-42.
84. Id.
85. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 429-30, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2020-21 (1971) (Black, J., and Blackman, J., each
dissenting). Blackmun wrote that the majority's decision "opens the door for another
avalanche of new federal cases. Whenever a suspect imagines, or chooses to assert, that
a fourth amendment right has been violated, he will now immediately sue the federal
officer in federal court." Id. at 430, 99 S. Ct. at 2021. Black wrote: "The courts of the
United States as well as those of the States are choked with lawsuits. The number of
cases on the docket of this Court have reached an unprecedented volume in recent years."
Id. at 428, 99 S. Ct. at 2020.
86. Id. at 429, 91 S. Ct. at 2021 (Black, J., dissenting).
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of action.17 Justice Black also construed the silence of Congress with
regard to actions against federal officials, in light of Congress' creation
of an action against state officials through § 1983, as a congressional
desire to prevent such lawsuits."8 Clearly, the dissenting justices in Bivens
believed the majority overreached its authority by creating a private
cause of action without any Congressional authorization.
The practical concerns of the dissenters in Bivens, that an "avalanche
of new federal cases" would result from the holding, has been largely
proven true. In the ten years following the decision, over 12,000 suits
were filed as Bivens actions. Fifteen years after Bivens, roughly one out
of every 300 federal officials was named as a defendant in a pending
Bivens action, and over 2600 suits involving over 10,000 present and
former federal officials were filed.8 9 A great number of these claims are
made by criminal defendants bringing a Bivens suit as a defense. The
cause of action is asserted in an attempt to use it as leverage in the
case, assuming a federal official might contemplate dismissing the suit
to avoid exposure to personal liability 0 But despite the argument that
Bivens has brought about an "avalanche" of cases, it has not resulted
in a dramatic increase in government officials' exposure to personal
liability. For despite the large number of suits brought against govern-
ment actors, few actually go to trial. For example, of the 12,000 claims
previously mentioned, only thirty resulted in judgments for the plain-
tiffs. 91
Besides, the large number of claims should not be a reason to deny
the cause of action. The mere grant of a right to bring the action does
not mean the alleged victim will be successful. Also, the fact that
meritless claims will be brought does not mean there are no real con-
stitutional violations, the victims of which deserve compensation. Moresi
and Bivens merely provide those alleged victims the chance to be heard,
and the courts must decide the claims on the merits. 92 That problem
must be resolved not by eliminating the cause of action, but rather by
defining it clearly to avoid the "avalanche" of claims.
Another concern of critics has been the inhibiting effect Bivens
actions may have on officials acting in the course of their duties. The
constitutional tort exposes officials to personal liability which could
hinder the government's enforcement procedures. As a result of this
87. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
88. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 428, 99 S. Ct. at 2020.
89. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 343 nn.40-42.
90. Id. at 344.
91. Id.
92. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). On remand, the Second Circuit found no immunity to protect
the agents from damage suits, but recognized a defense of good faith and reasonable
belief in the agents' action.
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concern, courts have tried to balance protecting the rights of individuals
and ensuring the proper functioning of the government. 93 The inhibitory
effect of such claims is minimal at most, considering that the courts'
balance usually tips in favor of the government actor. 94 Once again, the
best way to combat this criticism is not to eliminate the right of action
but rather to develop a rule of conduct for officials by developing clearly
established tests through judicial decisions or, perhaps more effectively,
developing guidelines through legislatively-created causes of action.
A final criticism comes from those who initially applauded the
creation of a constitutional tort, but who are now looking for alter-
natives. The doctrine of Bivens has been so weakened by the reluctance
of judges and juries to hold officials personally liable for actions taken
pursuant to their government employment that the purpose of the con-
stitutional tort has been largely unfulfilled. 95 Justice Brennan's own
escape clause for cases involving "special factors counselling hesita-
tion," 96 and the willingness of the judiciary to defer to "alternative
remedies" created by the legislatures, 97 have seriously weakened the
doctrine.
The "special factors" analysis is broad and unprincipled, allowing
the courts to create exceptions without much explanation. The most
common "special factor" cited by the U.S. Supreme Court is qualified
immunity, 98 but other exceptions have included non-citizenship of the 0
victim" and activity that is incidental to service in the military.100 States
generally have applied the exception based on the immunity of the
official, but other considerations have included the separation of powers'01
and the prevention of endless lawsuits brought under the constitution. 0 2
Unfortunately, state courts have applied without much discussion the
"special factors" exception to cases involving their state constitutions
in almost identical fashion as the federal courts in applying the federal
Constitution. But state courts must keep in mind that the U.S. Supreme
Court has held state constitutions to be an independent source of pro-
tection, and state courts are not bound by the federal courts' methods
93. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 338.
94. See Nichol, supra note 3; Rosen, supra note 3.
95. See Rosen, supra note 3.
96. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2005 (1971).
97. See Nichol, supra note 3, at 1124.
98. See Friesen, supra note 1, at 1273.
99. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
100. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
101. Vest v. Schafer, 757 P.2d 588 (Alaska 1988).
102. King v. Alaska St. Hous. Auth., 633 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1981).
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of interpreting constitutional guarantees.103 If the grant of a cause of
action would threaten the ability of another governmental body to
perform its authorized functions, then the court should recognize a
"special factor." Otherwise, the clause should not be used by the courts
to escape difficult decisions.
The exception for "alternative remedies" is just as broad, being
applied regardless of whether the alternative provides actual relief to
the injured party. Increasingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed
strong importance on congressional inaction as some form of policy
determination in deciding whether the Court's power should be exer-
cised.'04 States too are guilty of finding "alternative remedies" that in
fact provide no actual relief.105 But the remedy should be fundamentally
fair and actually redress the injury before a constitutional tort is rejected.
In Monroe v. Pape,'°0 the Supreme Court held that § 1983 was sup-
plemental to all other remedies and that the other state remedies did
not have to be sought before a cause of action under the statute would
exist. One of the primary concerns in drafting § 1983, according to the
Court in Monroe, was the unavailability of other remedies in practice. 7
States should approach actions under their own constitutions in the same
manner. They should consider not whether there is another avenue for
redress for the particular plaintiff, but rather whether the plaintiff will
be granted actual relief which is fair and appropriate.
IV. QUESTIONING THE STATE ACTION LIMIT
A. Development of the "State Actor" Limit
In holding that a constitutional tort existed as a cause of action
under the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Mo-
resi also stated in dicta that the state right to privacy provision'0 s provided
protection against private actors. This was a definite departure from
the traditional limitation of both the federal and state constitutional
prohibitions to "state actors." This traditional limitation finds its origins
103. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
104. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988).
105. In Cooney v. Park City, 792 P.2d 1287, 1298 n.7 (Wyo. 1990), the court stated
that criminal prosecution and disciplinary actions against an official provided an alternative
remedy. However, the official in question had been unaffected by the alternative remedy
and remained a member of the bar.
106. 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
107. Id. at 174, 81 S. Ct. at 477.
108. See La. Const. art. I, § 5. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567
So. 2d 1081, 1092 (1990).
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in the context of the U.S. Constitution. In Virginia v. Riveso9 it was
made clear that government action was the only action protected against
by the federal Constitution. Encroachments by private actors, it was
believed, were protected by the common law. 10 In 1883, the Court in
the Civil Rights Cases"' further outlined that distinction by stating:
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such
authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that indi-
vidual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party ... ; but
if not sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done under
state authority, his rights remain in full force, and may be
presumably vindicated by resort to the laws of the state for
redress. 112
However, the distinction between "state action" and private conduct
became increasingly unclear in the Warren era through a broader def-
inition of the "state action" concept." 3 For example, monopolies granted
by the state, closely-regulated businesses, and entities substantially in-
fluenced by the state were defined as "state actors" regarding consti-
tutional torts." 4 On the national level today, "it is clear that private
parties are subject to federal constitutional restraint ... if they are
directly influenced by, act in concert with or stand in place of some
government act or official."" 5
One primary reason for the continued watering down of the "state
action" limit is the growth of economic and political power in the hands
of private individuals that is not the result of influence from or co-
ordination with the national or state governments. Employers and land-
lords, among others, possess significant economic power which can and
109. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
110. Id.
111. 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883).
112. Id. at 17, 3 S. Ct. at 25-26.
113. A narrow view of what constituted "state action" remained in force until the
1940s, but then the Court began to broaden the concept which resulted in various acts
of private persons being attributed to the states. Two theories upon which this broad
definition was based are: (1) the actor is fulfilling a public function or something that
is governmental in nature, or (2) the connection or nexus between the state and the private
actor are so great that the state can be said to be involved in the activity.
114. Some cases involving the "public function" rationale include: Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296, 86 S. Ct. 486 (1966) (a park in Macon, Ga. was "municipal in nature");
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946) (involving a company town); and
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757 (1944). Cases involving the "nexus"
theory include: Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972) (involving a state
liquor license); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S. Ct. 1627 (1967).
115. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 822 n.8.
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will be used to prevent unwanted speech, to invade an individual's
privacy, or to deny equality of opportunity." 6 This concentrated private
power, which is often totally unrelated to governmental authority, can
threaten the fundamental values enumerated in constitutions in a way
similar to the threats posed by government that the framers of the
Constitution were concerned about in 1787. Therefore, if personal con-
stitutional rights are to be fully protected, the "state action" doctrine
must be dramatically eroded.
B. State Expansion
Presently, there appears to be a movement favoring a further re-
laxation of the "state action" limit on the state level. Commentators
have gone so far as to demand total elimination of the concept, asking
"why infringements of the most basic values-speech, privacy and equal-
ity-should be tolerated just because the violator is a private entity. '" 1 7
The division, commentators argue, should be made by focusing on the
content of the liberties, not the identity of the actors."' These arguments
have been somewhat successful on the state constitutional level where
a few state courts have essentially read the "state action" requirement
out of particular provisions of their respective state constitutions or have
done so practically by broadening their definitions of "state actor.""' 9
California has been one of the foremost states adopting an alternative
to the "state action" limit of the federal Constitution for its own
constitution. The principal case from California, PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 20 led to the U.S. Supreme Court's affirmance of the
state court's decision to abandon the threshold requirement of state
action for claims arising under its constitution. In that case, high school
students were not allowed to set up a table at the PruneYard Shopping
Center to solicit signatures for a petition opposing a United Nations
anti-Zionism resolution.
In holding that the state constitution guaranteed a right of access
for individuals to exercise their rights of free speech and petitioning,
the California Supreme Court decided it was not intended by the state
constitutional provisions to protect the individual in the use of his
property to such an extent as to enable him to use it to the detriment
of society. 2' Although the California decision was limited to large shop-
116. Id. at 883-902.
117. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 505.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., infra note 124.
120. 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
121. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ct., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd sub nom.
447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
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ping centers, the case made clear that courts could definitely interpret
state constitutions to grant greater protection of individual rights than
the U.S. Constitution. 2
Since that time, state courts have applied constitutional protections
against such private entities as shopping centers,'23 universities, 24 and
utilities.125 In Batchelder v. Allied Stores International,26 the court ruled
that Massachusetts Constitution Part 1, article 9, which states that "[a]ll
elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of this commonwealth,
having such qualifications as they shall establish by their frame of
government, have an equal right to elect officers, and to be elected,
for public employments, 1 1 27 did not require state action by regarding
as "meaningful the absence of state action language" in the provision. 2
In so holding, the court upheld Batchelder's right to solicit signatures
at a shopping center. Also, the California Supreme Court said a state-
protected public utility could not claim the prerogatives of private au-
tonomy to avoid responsibility in Gay Law Students Association.129
Although the court rejected the theory that the provision at issue applied
to all private conduct, it held that the utility was liable by finding that
the monopoly position of the utility and the substantial state regulation
"inextricably tie[d]" the state to the utility. 30
Also, in A Iderwood Association v. Washington Environmental Coun-
cil, '3 the Washington Supreme Court recognized the reasoning of
PruneYard which offered protection for the rights of individuals to
speak or petition on privately-owned property as long as they did not
interfere unreasonably with the constitutional rights of the property
owner. In State v. Schmid, 32 the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned
the defendant's conviction for trespass on a private university and held:
[T]he state constitution furnishes to individuals the complemen-
tary freedoms of speech and assembly and protects the reasonable
exercise of those rights. These guarantees extend directly to
122. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 820.
123. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983).
124. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465 (N.J. 1978).
125. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
126. 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983).
127. Mass. Const. Pt. 1, art. 9.
128. Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at 593.
129. Gay Law Students Ass'n, 595 P.2d 592.
130. Id. at 599.
131. 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981), overruled sub nom. Southcenter Joint Venture v.
National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 1982).
132. 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
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government entities as well as to persons exercising government
powers. They are also available against unreasonably restrictive
or oppressive conduct on the part of private entities that have
otherwise assumed a constitutional obligation not to abridge the
individual exercise of such freedoms.13 3
C. Moresi and the State Actor Limitation
Justice Dennis based his statement in Moresi that the Louisiana
Constitution does not merely apply to "state action" on the express
language of article I, section 5. While this portion of the opinion was
merely dicta, it signifies a tremendous step forward for advocates of
individual rights. In just one sentence, Justice Dennis indicated the
direction the court may take regarding application of article I, section
5: "[Tlhe expression 'no law shall' was not used, indicating that the
protection goes beyond limiting state action.' 3 4 Besides a few excep-
tions, '3 most of the provisions in Louisiana's Declaration of Rights
contain the phrase "no law shall" which expressly limits its application
to government actors. Under Justice Dennis' reasoning, all those ex-
ceptions, including article I, section 5, may be construed to provide
affirmative rights for individuals to be protected from both private and
governmental actors. 3 6
During the debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1973, the
possibility of article I, section 5 providing protection from private as
well as state action was mentioned, but not resolved. 3 7 It is clear that
the text of the provision allows, but does not require, an interpretation
that applies to conduct of private parties. It is also equally as clear
133. Id. at 628. Also, in Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska
1970), where the defendant asserted his right to a jury trial for violation of a city
ordinance, the Alaska court said the court was free and under a duty to develop additional
constitutional rights and protections if the protections are found to be within the "intention
and spirit of [the] local constitutional language." This reasoning was further discussed in
Schmid, 423 A.2d at 626-27, when the court said that "a basis for finding exceptional
vitality ... with respect to individual rights ... is found in part in the language
employed."
134. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1092 (La. 1990).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 78-84.
136. See supra note 7.
137. Connell L. Archey, Comment, The Status of Private Searches Under the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 49 La. L. Rev. 873, 876 (1989). During the convention debate on
what is now article I, section 5, it was pointed out that the provision could apply to
private as well as state action. See also Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention
of 1973: Transcripts, Vol. VI, August 31, 1973, at 1076. The issue was never resolved
and some years later a co-author of the Declaration of Rights wrote that "[tihe section
is intended to apply solely to government action." Woody Jenkins, The Declaration of
Rights, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 9, 28 (1975). See also Hargrave, supra note 44.
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that the text and history of article I, section 5 do not provide an answer
to the question of whether or not it should be interpreted in such a
way. '3 This has left the debate-at least until such an answer is provided
by the legislators-to the courts.
In 1978, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressed some willingness
to offer article I, section 5 protections against private actors in State
v. Nelson.3 9 In that case, private security guards conducted a search of
a suspected shoplifter based on the authority vested in Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure article 215, the shoplifter statute. 4° The evidence
obtained through the search was excluded after the court found the
guards' conduct to be unreasonable and beyond the authority of the
statute. Justice Tate stated, "[T]he state cannot use an involuntary
admission of culpability by the defendant, however and by whomever
obtained, as evidence of the accused's guilt.' 4' His statement implies
that the protections of the state constitution were enforceable against
private actors as well as those actors within the authority of the state.
Justice Tate stated that the court was resting its ruling on the unrea-
sonableness of the search, but by discussing the reasonableness of a
search conducted by "semi-private" actors the court has "tacitly affirmed
that article 1, section 5 does prohibit unreasonable searches by private
persons." 42
As the facts of Nelson illustrate, the interpretation of prohibitions
such as those found in article I, section 5 to include the conduct of
private actors is justified and reasonable. When private actors are placed
in positions of authority, such as the guards in Nelson, or when private
citizens possess extreme power and control over other individuals based
on their wealth or position in society, it no longer seems rational to
distinguish them from persons acting under authority of the state. In
Bivens, Justice Brennan discussed the disparity between state actors and
private citizens in granting a remedy under the Fourth Amendment.'4 3
138. The court's discussion of the reasonableness of private searches implies that the
protections of article I, Section 5 apply to those private searches, but in State v. Wilkerson,
367 So. 2d 319, 321 (La. 1979), the court stated: "[T]his court has yet to decide whether
Article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution bans unreasonable searches by private
citizens as well as police."
139. 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978).
140. Article 215 states in part:
A peace officer, merchant, or a specifically authorized employee or agent of a
merchant, may use reasonable force to detain a person for questioning on the
merchant's premises, for a length of time, not to exceed sixty minutes, unless
it is reasonable under the circumstances that the person be detained longer ....
La. Code Crim. P. art. 215.
141. Nelson, 354 So. 2d at 542 (emphasis added).
142. See Archey, supra note 137, at 883.
143. Bivens v, Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2002 (1971).
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When that same disparity exists between private parties, the policy behind
the Bivens decision should apply equally. Therefore, constitutional pro-
visions, such as article I, section 5, should require the same remedial
measures for private party violations as it does when the violating party
happens to be a state actor.
D. Criticism of Expansion
A major objection to elimination of the "state action" limit is that
without it courts seeking to vindicate the rights of one party might
infringe on important rights or liberties of the other private parties
involved. 1" In Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown,1 45 the Alaska
Supreme Court began its inquiry by determining what weight to place
on the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged act. Depending
on the primacy of that interest, the court said the complainant will have
a greater or lesser burden of proof in order to bring a successful claim.
A similar balance can be used in application of article I, section 5,
which requires that a search, seizure, or invasion of privacy be unrea-
sonable before it will merit constitutional protection by the court. For
example, when an employer searches an employee's locker at work based
on the employer's suspicion of alcohol or drug use by the employee
during work, the court can take into account the type of work involved
and whether or not society is put at risk by possible alcohol or drug
use. If the employee is operating heavy machinery or is responsible for
the care of others, the court is more likely to find the search reasonable.
Also, the court can consider the diminished privacy expectations of an
employee in an on-site locker. For instance, the outcome would be
different if the employer searched the employee's car or home for
evidence of alcohol or drug use. "[T]he courts are given flexibility to
determine which invasions of privacy are supported by societal interests
to be considered reasonable. In this inquiry, the courts are guided by
the purpose of the convention in expanding the individual's protections
in this area beyond the existing law."'
Another criticism of the elimination of the "state actor" limit, as
well as of the Bivens action as mentioned above, 47 is the "avalanche"
of cases that might result from such expansions. The constitution would
not only provide a private remedy for violations of the constitution,
but its restrictions would be imposed on private relations as well. But
the courts have already begun to develop limits on these types of claims.
For example, many claims are denied for lack of standing or the in-
144. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 872.
145. 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).
146. See Hargrave, supra note 44, at 21.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 84-92.
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appropriateness of a damages remedy. In Rockhouse Mountain Property
Owners Association, Inc. v. Town of Conway,'4 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that damages were an inappropriate remedy for a
property owner's claim that the defendant's refusal to lay out certain
roads infringed on his rights to equal protection under the state con-
stitution. The court held that the right should be recognized and deserved
vindication through the law, but because the nature of equal protection
claims was the contrast of treatment between the plaintiff and others
rather than an injury from a particular act, damages would be inap-
propriate. The court pointed out that "[t]here is . . . virtually no limit
to the variety of activities that can provide . . . an equal protection
claim."' 49 One factor considered by the court was that the injury was
not such that it could not be redressed by the judiciary, in which case
damages might be appropriate. 50
Critics also urge that any abandonment or weakening of the "state
action" limit will violate the traditional understanding of the purpose
of the constitution and will represent a "slippery slope likely to lead
to inappropriate imposition of constitutional restraints on a broad range
of private relations."'' Opponents say that abandonment of the re-
quirement is antidemocratic and allows the judiciary to involve itself in
traditionally legislative functions which ultimately gives too much power
to unrepresentative courts.' 2 But the importance of protecting individual
liberties is at least equal to (if it does not outweigh) the concerns for
structure in the separation of powers doctrine and the importance of
allocating power among the branches.' 53 Also, the electorate retains
significant democratic power over the court in many states. 5 4 Finally,
as seen in those states adopting statutory protections against constitu-
tional violations, the legislature retains the ultimate power to limit and
structure remedies for individual rights. 5
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
\
A. A Legislative Solution
As the previous discussion indicates, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has the authority to recognize a constitutional tort as it did in Moresi,
148. 503 A.2d 1385 (N.H. 1986).
149. Id. at 1388.
150. Id.
151. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 860.
152. See Friesen, supra note 10, at 116.
153. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 552-53.
154. See Friesen, supra note 10, at 116-1-7. Also, see infra notes 157-160 and accom-
panying text for states adopting statutory protection of constitutional rights.
155. Id.
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as well as the power to extend that remedy against private actors.' 516 By
holding that such a cause of action exists under article I, section 5 of
the Louisiana Constitution, the supreme court expressed its belief that
individual rights deserve protection and its willingness to provide such
protection when those rights have been violated.
However, there is a more practical and appropriate way to enforce
the state constitution's protections. Considering the current conservative
approach of the U.S. Supreme Court and the tendency of many state
courts to summarily adopt that approach, along with the extreme dis-
parity of individual power and wealth in today's society, a legislatively-
created cause of action for the violation of a constitutional right would
lead to a more consistent and effective application of the Bivens doctrine.
The legislature is the more appropriate body to create such a cause of
action because it can define its limits through public debate, and those
limits will exist prior to the conduct that could possibly bring about an
action. A legislatively-created cause of action will eliminate much of the
criticism of cases like Bivens and Moresi. Those actors governed by the
statutes can model their conduct according to the law to avoid liability.
The elements of the cause of action can be provided in the text of the
statute to better limit the number of cases and avoid meritless claims.
Also, courts will be less likely to dismiss a claim for "special factors"
when there is a mandate from the state legislature for such a cause of
action. By using a statute to expand the constitutional protections to
limit private conduct, the legislature would bypass the process of de-
veloping guidelines for the doctrine in the courtroom.
Massachusetts, in response to a growing number of violent incidents
of racial harassment, adopted the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
("MCRA") in 1979, often called "little 1983."'' 17 The MCRA grants a
cause of action securing the rights provided under the state constitution
against both goveinment and private actors. It also grants costs and
attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs. By enacting the MCRA, the
156. See supra text accompanying notes 78-84.
157. Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, ch. 12, §§ 11-H to -1 (1988). Section H provides:
Whenever any person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law,
interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats,
intimidation or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person
or persons of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States
or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, the
attorney general may bring a civil action for injunctive or other appropriate
equitable relief in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the
right or rights secured.
Section I allows actions by private citizens.
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legislature provided an appropriate remedy for specific constitutional
violations and limited the scope of the cause of action through the text
of the statute. For example, the requirement that the infringement be
through "threats, intimidation and coercion" allows courts to narrowly
define the type of conduct giving rise to a claim. The phrasing tends
to limit the action to situations where there is a disparity of power or
control between the parties. California and Maine have adopted statutes
similar to the MCRA.'5 s Until 1990, Utah granted a cause of action for
state constitutional violations that limited its application to "victims of
peace officers' violations of so-called 'fourth amendment rights."' 5 9
Nebraska holds persons liable for subjecting another to the deprivation
of constitutional rights.' 60
In enacting a statute that grants a cause of action for violations of
a guarantee of the state constitution, legislators must provide express
limits or guidelines in the text of the statute, or the statute will face
the same problems that arise from a judicially-created cause of action.
As discussed above, the use of precise language, such as the "threats,
intimidation and coercion" language used in the text of the MCRA,
can limit the conduct that will be actionable. Also, a specific reference
to the right being protected by the statute, as provided by the 1982
Utah statute, will further limit its application. By using these approaches
in constructing a statute, the Louisiana Legislature could provide rules
of law that can be directly applied by courts and a rule of conduct
that can be followed by both private and state actors.' 6'
B. Until Then ...
That a statutory cause of action would be the optimal approach to
securing the protections of article I, section 5 does not mean, however,
158. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (West 1987); Maine Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 5, § 4681 (1989).
159. See Friesen, supra note 1, at 1287. 1982 Utah Laws Ch. 10, §§ 5-8 (repealed by
1990 Utah Laws Ch. 15, § 4). The statute also provided for a waiver of sovereign
immunity, a minimum of $100 attorney's fees, and additional actual and punitive damages.
The remedy was in lieu of exclusion of evidence except when the officers were not in
good faith. The statute was repealed in 1990 because the Utah Supreme Court, in State
v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 185 (Utah 1987), declared its provisions creating a good faith
exception to investigatory stops and searches unconstitutional.
160. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-148 (1987).
161. Such a statute could be phrased:
Any person, whether or not acting under color of state law, that interferes by
unreasonable threats, intimidation or coercion, or that attempts to interfere by
unreasonable threats, intimidation or coercion with a person's exercise or en-
joyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or
the constitution or laws of Louisiana shall be liable to the party injured as a
result of that conduct.
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that Moresi was a mistake. The possibility of a better approach does
not relieve the courts of their obligation to give meaning to the pro-
tections of the constitution. Until such alternative is created and is
shown to actually provide redress for the victim of a constitutional
violation, judicial enforcement is the best method. The rights and values
of the constitution exist today; the cause of action to protect them
cannot wait for an alternative, "better" approach from the legislative
body.
In order to avoid the "avalanche" of litigation which could result
from recognizing the constitutional tort, the judiciary can limit the
number of claims by defining the types of constitutional violations that
give rise to a Bivens claim. Once the courts accept the existence of a
constitutional tort, they can begin to establish elements of the cause of
action that will limit the availability of the doctrine and allow officials
to adjust their conduct accordingly without interfering with the functions
of the government. A basic guideline for courts to use is that the
complainant must have some individualized injury to make a claim. 62
It cannot be a generalized complaint about a practice affecting a group
of people. The claim must have an injured party and a particular
defendant who has violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Also, in order to legitimately provide protection against private
infringement, the courts must address the criticisms of the approach
and develop guidelines for its application. The most frequent suggestion
of commentators favoring this approach is that the court balance the
interests and weigh the relevant factors affecting the parties rather than
dismiss the action based on the absence of a single threshold requirement
of "state action."' 63 This would require courts to decide whether the
individual rights should be vindicated based on the merits of the claim
rather than on the irrelevant question of whether the conduct was that
of a state actor. In reaching the merits of the claim, the court must
balance the competing rights and impose restraints only when the in-
fringement on fundamental liberties caused by the violation outweighs
the imposition of constitutional restraints on the defendant. 1" In Alaska
Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 65 the court began its analysis by
quantifying the various interests at stake. Also, in Robins v. PruneYard
Shopping Center,'" the California Supreme Court recognized that rights
of an individual are held in subordination to rights of society. The court
162. Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Assoc. v. Town of Conway, 503 A.2d
1385 (N.H. 1986).
163. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 885; Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 506; and William
B. Harvey, Private Restraint of Expressive Freedom: A Post-PruneYard Assessment, 69
B.U. L. Rev. 929, 958 (1989).
164. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 886.
165. 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).
166. 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1980).
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stated in its opinion, which was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, 6 7
that the interests of society justify restraints upon individuals. "By
protecting individual rights, society did not part with the power to protect
itself or to promote its general well-being."' 68 This reasoning could
provide another guideline for courts in enforcing constitutional protec-
tions against private individuals. Only those fundamental rights protected
by the state constitution whose violation would "shock the conscience"' 69
of society or would be substantially adverse to society's expectations
will give rise to a private cause of action. This test would not only
limit the types of injuries to be redressed, but it would also limit the
class of individuals likely to be defendants in such a cause of action.
Such a "shock the conscience" requirement will typically limit the class
of defendants to those defendants who have such power and ability to
cause an extreme injury to a person's right to privacy.
This leads to the final considerations in limiting the application of
constitutional restraints on private conduct. Each provision must be
examined. Only the most important and fundamental state constitutional
rights should justify judicial intervention, and judicial restraint should
be practiced even in those cases unless those rights have been violated
in some important respect.17 0 In using this standard, the courts will
answer the question of whether to apply the cause of action separately
for each clause, and not generally for the entire constitution. This can
be done by reference to the text of the provision and to the history
and purpose of the individual clauses of the constitution."' Also, the
expansion can be limited to prohibitions on those exercising "impersonal
power," power that some individuals exercise by reason of wealth,
position, or some other factor that allows them to control others.' 72 As
the California Supreme Court reasoned in Robins,'73 only that conduct
which is detrimental to society's general welfare will give rise to a cause
of action. Normally, only those individuals possessing a great amount
of economic or "impersonal" power or power authorized by the gov-
ernment will be able to produce such effects by their actions. Persons
acting merely in their private capacities should not be subjected to
constitutional restraint. However, when that individual possesses the
ability to enforce his opinions and beliefs on a scale analogous to the
167. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
168. Robins, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1980).
169. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209 (1952).
170. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 885.
171. See Friesen, supra note 10, at 111-12, and see generally Hargrave, supra note
44.
172. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 885.
173. 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1980).
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government's authority, his actions must be similarly limited by the
constitution.
Thus, the court's role is an important one. Until the legislature
develops a statute providing protection against the "impersonal power"
of government and private entities, the courts have an obligation to
implement and enforce the protections of the state constitution. Not
only does the text of article I, section 5 allow such enforcement by the
state courts, but change in the structure of society and distribution of
power today, and the limited right to remedies on the federal level,
calls the courts to take action in providing meaningful enforcement of
the provision. Even if the legislature chooses to establish a framework
for applying the protections of article I, section 5, the courts must be
careful to give the statute substance and not weaken it by a conservative
interpretation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The two approaches to securing individual rights discussed in Moresi
v. Department of Wildlife and Fisheries have been criticized by many
as an overreaching of judicial power that will open the floodgates to
countless claims. But Louisiana, as well as other states adopting similar
approaches to their own constitution, must not collapse under the crit-
icism. Any objection to the constitutional tort and the elimination of
the "state action" limit must be balanced against the strong textual and
theoretical arguments supporting them, as well as the necessitous special
circumstances that face today's society. Such a balance illustrates the
ability of the state courts to act and the importance of their striving
to do so in order to provide real rights and adequate remedies for
individuals whose rights have been infringed. Moresi is the first step
for Louisiana.
The text of article I, section 5 and the history behind the Louisiana
Constitution, along with the constitutions of the several other states
adopting these approaches, create the opportunity for the courts to
provide greater protections for individual rights than does the federal
Constitution. In Moresi, Justice Dennis said that by its clear terms and
by its placement in the Declaration of Rights, article I, section 5 es-
tablished an affirmative right to privacy that extends to non-criminal
cases. Once it found the private cause of action under the constitution,
the court asserted that damages always have been regarded as the ap-
propriate remedy, thus the Bivens action was adopted. Also, the absence
of "no law shall" in the provision tends to indicate there is no "state
action" limit on the guarantee; rather, the rights are protected against
everyone.
In addition to the doctrinal arguments above, there are practical
necessities for Moresi. Government and private entities have increasing
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power over individuals. While "state actors" concededly must be limited
in the exercise of their authority to carry out governmental objectives,
many private actors today require the same limits. Economic strength
and governmental authorization have provided private entities with the
same unequal share of power that the Court in Bivens cited as a factor
in creating the necessity for a private cause of action against government
officials. The possibility of expanding constitutional protections has been
asserted throughout the ages. The authors of the Bill of Rights and the
several state constitutions knew society was changing constantly and the
law should be adapted accordingly. 74 Both the legal climate of our
nation, with an increasingly conservative approach to the federal pro-
tections, and the economic realities previously discussed demand that
state courts address those rights guaranteed in their own constitutions
and provide real protection against both state and private actors.
The rights enumerated in our state constitutions require enforcement
and implementation by the courts, or the rights, in practical effect, do
not exist. Moresi offers Louisiana courts an opportunity to put meaning
behind the words of the Declaration of Rights by securing the adoption
of a Bivens type of action and establishing a clear and just approach
to providing those causes of action to individuals whose rights have
been infringed upon by private actors. While it can be asserted that
such causes of action are best left for the legislature to develop, as in
the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, 75 it cannot be said that those rights
"guaranteed" in the constitution cease to exist until the legislature
expressly creates the causes of action. The courts are obligated to im-
plement the constitution and have a moral duty to ensure that the
cherished rights granted therein to the citizens of the state are upheld.
Moresi is the first indication that the Louisiana courts are willing to
accept that duty.
Mindy L. McNew
174. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
175. See supra note 154.
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